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ABSTRACT 
An Association Agreement concluded between the European Union and Chile in 2002 included a comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that entered into force in February 2003. Our purpose is to analyse some of the 
economic consequences of the agricultural part of this agreement focusing in the fruit and vegetable market. Our 
finding is that market concentration has significantly decreased since the beginning of previous dec ade and has 
been reinforced in both markets. This has been an advantage for both Chilean producers and European consumers 
of fruits and vegetables. 
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1 Introduction 
The Association Agreement concluded between the European Union and Chile in 2002 included a 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that entered into force in February 2003. Our purpose is to 
analyse some of the economic consequences of this agreement, focusing on the fruit and vegetable 
market. This sector has had particular relevance in Chile with many exporters and importers in the 
market. Furthermore, those products are closer to commodities. 
Our starting point is that the Agreement has opened up new opportunities for trade. Since 2000, Europe’s 
imports of fresh fruit and vegetables from Chile and Argentina have increased significantly. Until 2003, 
both countries followed a similar trend but since then Chile’s exports have been growing more 
dynamically (figure 1). 
 
 
 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from COMEXT (EuroStat) 
 
Figure 1. Import of fruits and vegetables in the EU27 (1000 EUROS) 
 
Carstensen (2000) and Domina and Taylor (2010) pointed out that market concentration is harmful to 
producers and consumers. This article aims to answer two questions related to the welfare both of 
Chilean fruit and vegetable producers and European consumers.  
The first one relates to the evolution of the degree of concentration of Chilean exporters to the European 
Union. If their numbers have significantly increased and the level of concentration decreased, competition 
amongst them will have risen, and at least part of the rent created by the agreement will have been 
transferred to Chile’s fruit and vegetable producers. The second one relates to the evolution of the degree 
of concentration among European’s importers of Chilean goods. Here again, if competition between them 
has increased, this should be beneficial for suppliers, who should receive a better price and for consumers 
who should also see their welfare increase. 
Section 2 illustrates the methodology and the database used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the 
results, and section 4 some conclusions. 
2 Methodology  
The first and most famous index used in order to assess market concentration in a particular sector is the 
Gini Index and its graphical representation (Lorenz curve). 
Several more complex methodologies have been used in order to deepen the analysis. Miller (1967) used 
the Firm’s concentration ratio in order to assess the cumulative participation of larger firms. the Linda 
Index (1976) measures  inequality of market participation, but in terms of different groups; the Entropy 
Index (Theil, 1967) corresponds to the degree of uncertainty in a particular market structure, which a 
company faces to keep a random client; the Comprehensive Industrial Concentration Index  (Horvath, 
1970) includes relative dispersal and absolute magnitude; the Kwoka Dominance Index (1977) focuses on 
the structure of a company’s market participation; the Melnik Dominance Index (Shy Stenbacka, 2007) is 
a measure to identify when a company could have a dominant position in a particular market..  
In order to analyse market concentration, Hirschman (1954, 1964) developed the Herfindhal-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) and used it in his book: “National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade.” Later on, 
Herfindhal (1950) reformulated it in order to measure industrial concentration in a particular country.  
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It is calculated as  
   
where:   Herfindahl-Hirschman Index;  
    participation of the i
th
 company in the market;  
  n number of firms in the industry or cluster.
*
  
The main difficulty in applying this index is that it needs a powerful database with the individual data of 
the different companies active in the market, but luckily it could have access to the full database of 
exporters and importers managed by the Chilean Fruit Exporter Association (ASOEX
†
). The other data used 
in this analysis, customs data and information on Argentina, have been collected by the Centre for Fruit 
and Vegetable Information (Centro de Información Frutihortícola, CIF
‡
). 
HHI is the only methodology validated by international regulation to analyse economic market 
concentration. It is used by the European Union, the United States and other national authorities. Under 
United States regulation
§
, the index is interpreted as follows: 
 
HHI < 1000 = Low concentration level. 
1000 < HHI < 1800 = Moderate concentration level. 
HHI > 1800 = High concentration level. 
 
European Union legislation differs only in that high economic concentration is indicated by more than 2 
000 points. In order to compare results between different countries (or when there are significant 
changes in the number of companies participating in the market from one year to another) the 
“normalised” HHI is often used. This is a percentage (Baumann, 2009).  
 
The normalised HHI formula is:  
 
The international relevance of HHI is confirmed by the large numbers of studies and articles published 
that use this methodology in different areas such as mental health (Williams, Doessel, Scheurer, 
Whiteford, 2006;821); agribusiness exports (Sawaya Jank et al, 2001); retail sales (Hernant, Andrerson, 
Hilmola (2007;916); banking (Al-Muharrami, 2009;447); e-commerce (Porterfield, Bailey, Evers, 2010;443; 
consumer demand (Stablein, Holweg, Miemczyk, 2011;355); internationalisation (Elango, 2011;452); 
performance after privatisation (Wu, 2007;52); logistics (Maloni, Carter, Carr, 2009;254); new product 
development (Veflen Olsen, Sallis, 2010;386); location decisions (Zelbs, Frazier, Sower, 2011;888) and 
branding (Damoiseau, Black, Raggio, 2011;273) among others. 
The index is also occasionally used in an adjusted way to assess whether a country has a concentrated or 
unconcentrated export portfolio sector. In this case, the share of the sector exports is compared to the 
total national exports, using the FAO databases or Comtrade (Mikic, Gilbert, 2007; Brun, 2009; Ta deu et 
al, 2012; Orszaghova et al, 2013).   
                                                 
*
 Possible outcomes go from 0 to 10 000. For example, considering a monopoly that controls the whole market (100%), 
therefore 100 squared  is 10 000 as an index. As another example, if two companies share the market equally: 50% 
of the market each, 100 is  2 500 each, which adding it calculates an index from 5000 points. If 4 companies 
controlled the market 30%, 30%, 20% and 20% respectively; it would be + + +  = 2600 points. 
Considering 10 companies with an individual 10% participation + 
+ + + + + + + + = 1000 points. 
†
 http://www.asoex.cl/AsoexWeb/Menu.asp?Id_Menu=70 
‡
 http://www.cif-businessintelligence.com/ 
§
 http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm 
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3 Results  
This section
 
discusses the results for both exporting and importing companies. Where relevant, it is 
focused on the 2 main products exported to the European Union by Chile and Argentina in 2012 (table 
grapes and apples) and their evolution since 2003 (Table 1). Detailed tables can be found in the annex. 
Export structure. From 2003 to 2011, the number of companies exporting fruit and vegetable from Chile 
to the European Union increased by 54%, from 253 to 390 (Table 2). New actors were particularly found in 
grape exports (52); avocados (35); kiwis (35), blueberries (32) and apples (19)
**
. Our indicator of the 
degree of concentration for Chilean exporters decreased from moderate (1.231) to low (701) at an a nnual 
rate of 3.6% with 3 exceptions: pears, kiwis and citrus fruit (Table 3).  
Import structure. Over the same period, the number of European companies importing Chilean fruit and 
vegetables also increased, by more than 28%, from 458 to 587 (Table 4). By product, the newcomers are 
mainly active in grapes (47), apples (48), kiwis (23), avocados (31) and stone fruits (26). In this case, the 
low level of concentration is maintained but with a decrease in the index from 788 to 617 (Table 5) with 
one exception - citrus - which is a minor component of Chile’s exports. 
Trend in market concentration. Figure 2 summarises the conclusions. Market concentration, both for 
Chilean exporting and European importing companies, is generally decreasing. The exceptions are pear s, 
kiwis and citrus on the export side and citrus on the import side. At this stage, it is not able to explain 
these divergences, which merit further research. 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Chilean Exporters Association 
 
Figure 2. Trend of trading structure of the main fruits. 
 
Major differences between regions or countries can be summatrized as follows (figure 3): 
 
 In the north of Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden), the structure of the retail 
sector results in their markets being among the most concentrated (HHI: Above 2 000 points is a high 
concentration).  
 Market concentration is also fairly high in Eastern European countries such as Poland, Romania, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia. Only a few companies import directly from Chile, most trade being re-
exports from the Netherlands or Germany. Trade in the United Kingdom is also moderately 
concentrated (HHI: between 1 000 and 2 000 points is a moderate concentration). 
 The “central” region (Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland), and the “Mediterranean” 
Member States (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece and France), represent the lowest degree of 
concentration, both for exporters and importers (HHI: less than 1 000 points is a low concentration). 
 
                                                 
**
 Some new companies are active in several products and are counted once in each of them.  
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Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Chilean Exporters Association 
 
Figure 3. Chilean fruit: economic concentration index in 2012 
 
Full details are provided in the statistical annex. The results for table grapes and apples, the two most 
important products regading their economic impact are discussed in the following in more detail.  
The grape market has never been concentrated (figure 4) and it is becoming less concentrated, on both 
the export and the import side, throughout Europe, except in the United K ingdom.  
 
 
 
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Chilean Exporters Association 
 
Figure 4. Table grapes: trend of international trade structure 
 
The apple market shows a similar development (figure 5). The import side moves from a “moderate ” to a 
“low” concentration on the index while for importing regions that have always had a low concentration 
there is also an increase in the number of  companies (Annex tables 4 and 5).  
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Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Chilean Exporters Association 
 
Figure 5. Apples: trend of international trade structure. 
 
Benchmarking: For both products, a comparison between Chile and Argentina is instructive (table 6). In 
the latter, exports of apples have fallen while table grape exports are stab le, but their market 
concentration is high or moderate, and in all cases significantly higher than in Chile. The number of apple 
exporting companies is stable (44), but the number of table grape exporters has fallen (from 50 to 41).   
For both products, the economic concentration of exporters is higher in Argentina than in Chile 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, normalised) with some exceptions: exports of apples to the United Kingdom 
(figure 6) and table grapes to Eastern Europe (figure 7). 
As Argentina has no Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, Argentinian exporters have not only 
been unable to profit from new market opportunities but have paid some 30 M. € per year (300 M. € 
between 2003, the first year of the EU-Chile FTA, and 2012) in EU import duties. Due to the seasonal 
effect, it is primordial to keep Bartlett or William pears in cold storage until October, when no EU import 
duties apply, they have to face storage costs and the loss of market opportunities during those months of 
the campaign. It is inescapable to conclude that, in the absence of an FTA, Argentine exporters not only 
fail to take advantage of new market opportunities but have to face import duties and additional storage 
costs.  
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the the Customs of Chile and Argentine (table 6) 
 
Figure 6. Apples: Comparative export market concentration. 
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Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the the Customs of Chile and Argentine (table 6) 
 
Figure 7. Table grapes: Comparative export markt concentration 
4 Conclusions 
Chile’s fruit and vegetable sector has taken advantage of the FTA with the European Union. Their exports 
have seen a sustained growth, in clear contrast with neighbouring Argentina, which has no FTA with the 
EU. It is important to know how this rent is shared among the different actors of the food chain. Who 
profits from this increased economic rent?  
In order to answer this question, this research has been focused on the evolution of the degree of 
concentration on both the export and the import side. The findings are that concentration has fallen 
markedly since the beginning of the last decade and competition reinforced in both markets. This 
increased competition has been a remarkable advantage for both Chilean producers and European 
consumers of fruit and vegetables. 
The decrease in the Normalized HHI for Chilean exporters and EU importers is directly related to the 
increase in Chilean export and EU import companies. For Argentina, the higher normalized HHI is the 
result of a less dynamic evolution, as it has been shown in the two case studies for apples and table 
grapes. This quantitative result is reinforced by a qualitative analysis of Chile’s new exporters.  A 
significant majority of them are also farmers who have benefited from a number of public interventions
††
. 
In Argentina, only one enterprise that both produces and exports has registered a significant growth, a 
consortium composed of 23 companies and 260 producers.  
This analysis is obviously partial, limited to a single group of products and a single country. Therefore, this 
article has not the objective of drawing general conclusions on the economic and social impact of Free 
Trade Agreements, but it is inescapable to affirm that in this case the FTA has decreased market 
concentration considering that the winners are both the Chilean producers and EU consumers.  
This conclusion differs from other studies such as that by the IATP (2010) which underlined "the role of 
trade agreements in concentrating markets both within the U.S. and within the region" or by Wise and 
Rakocy (2010) on the "Smithfield and the NAFTA" case.   
Several factors can contribute to explaining the discrepancy. Pork, fruit and vegetables are commodities 
but the overall degree of food chain integration is completely different: While the pork chain is highly 
concentrated, the latter is more competitive. The case of “Smithfield and the NAFTA” has been able to 
mobilize the comparative advantage of Mexico with any, or very limited, sunk costs.   
The results cannot be understood without taking into account two technological changes that took place 
during the period, contributing to transform market opportunities into economic realities.  The internet 
has reduced sunk costs, which is particularly relevant for exporters  in developing countries (Freund and 
                                                 
††
 CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de Chile), FDI (Fondo de desarrollo e innovación); FAT (Fondo de Asistencia Técnica); 
PROFO (Proyecto de Fomento productivo); PAG (Programa de Apoyo a la gestión de la Empresa); PDP (Programa de 
desarrollo de proveedores) and FONTEC (Fondo nacional de desarrollo productivo y tecnológico). 
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Weinhold, 2000; Clarke and Wallsten, 2006). Increasing containerisation has not only stimulated the 
international trade but also has allowed small and medium exporters from developing countries to have 
full access to maritime transport (Hummels, 2007; Novo-Corti and Gonzalez-Laxe, 2009; Bernhofen, El-
Sahli and Kneller, 2013).   
For European producers of fruit and vegetables, the fact that European consumer welfare has increased is 
potentially another advantage. We share the view of Compés et al (2013) that “If a trade agreement is 
efficient, it generates enough wealth so that the winners can compensate the losers and increase the 
global wealth”. If there are losers amongst European producers, there is a basis for possible  
compensation. 
The final conclusion is that for this kind of case study it is really useful to assess the economic 
consequences of Free Trade Agreements. Models "Ex ante" are used for evaluations and as powerful 
tools, before the event. “Ex post” analyses are needed in order to feed the discussions on their impact 
after the event.  
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STATISTICAL ANNEX 
Table 1. 
Chile and Argentina: main products exported to the EU (1000 Euro) 
 
Details of fruit and vegetable 
Chile 
2003 
Argentine 
2003 
Chile 
2012 
Argentine 
2012 
Onions 8.392 
 
28.846 15.666 27.902 
Other vegetables 1.427 
 
2.035 787 0 
Table grapes and raisins 169.870 
 
35.620 308.265 37.627 
Apples and Pears 184.013 180.501 187.805 109.992 
Stone fruits 41.633 
 
18.398 80.808 6.959 
Kiwis, Blueberries and other berries 69.609 
 
2.508 143.145 38.068 
Citrus 7.416 202.401 10.438 208.596 
Avocados 8.055 935 59.717 667 
Other fruits 19.017 288 72.560 12.482 
Total Import F&V 509.432 471.533 879.191 442.294 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from COMEXT (Eurostat) 
 
Table 2. 
Chile: Evolution of companies exporting to the EU27 
Export/years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Companies 253 291 299 315 339 346 370 417 390 
Table grapes 140 153 160 167 175 186 178 209 192 
Apples 82 90 92 94 101 99 102 97 101 
Pears 61 59 62 63 64 58 55 55 57 
Blueberries 28 26 23 30 40 45 36 50 60 
Citrus 16 19 24 24 34 30 27 34 33 
Kiwi 70 73 68 75 77 85 99 107 105 
Stone fruits 92 102 97 100 104 112 113 112 102 
Frozen fruits 45 52 51 53 64 66 61 56 61 
Avocados 13 38 46 73 57 50 80 66 48 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Customs of Chile 
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Table 3. 
Chile: Evolution of economic concentration in exports top UE27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the the Customs of Chile 
 
Table 4. 
UE27: Evolution of the companies importing of Chilean fruit 
Import/Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Companies 458 553 565 540 594 591 584 596 587 
Table grapes 196 212 216 205 216 237 222 235 243 
Apples 184 219 244 251 249 245 224 223 232 
Pears 106 119 120 120 125 121 120 119 125 
Blueberries 49 51 40 39 44 43 47 58 68 
Citrus 28 36 40 45 48 49 49 57 38 
Kiwi 149 165 181 187 199 208 200 192 172 
Stone fruits 165 215 221 214 220 224 201 195 191 
Frozen fruits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Avocados 16 29 35 55 63 58 76 57 47 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Chilean Exporters Association 
Export/years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
HHI average 1.230 984 1.070 972 987 920 1.034 944 701 
Table grapes 527 469 488 500 446 438 407 373 456 
Apples 1.031 909 868 936 987 920 789 850 701 
Pears 1.241 1.099 1.241 1.277 1.438 1.375 1.375 1.638 1.828 
Blueberries 2.753 4.365 5.914 4.437 3.043 2.549 2.793 2.214 2.144 
Citrus 1.674 2.032 1.924 2.265 1.887 2.029 2.565 1.559 2.695 
Kiwi 567 485 603 620 595 578 583 598 669 
Stone fruits 857 593 627 659 560 568 576 641 642 
Frozen fruits 1.230 984 1.070 972 797 708 1.034 944 697 
Avocados 3.390 2.593 2.303 1.708 2.002 2.250 1.867 1.879 1.877 
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 Table 5.  
UE27: Evolution of economic concentration in Chilean fruit importers 
 
Import/Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
HHI average 788 752 709 711 655 598 615 621 617 
Table grapes 536 572 582 627 592 560 497 561 457 
Apples 718 656 554 554 564 526 535 560 527 
Pears 859 848 726 747 718 636 668 657 681 
Blueberries 1.954 3.460 4.257 3.755 2.959 2.404 2.689 2.197 1.751 
Citrus 1.810 1.876 2.047 2.170 1.128 1.174 2.255 1.486 3.388 
Kiwi 666 385 610 514 462 367 476 478 510 
Stone fruits 673 616 692 674 572 487 563 585 553 
Frozen fruits          
Avocados 2.269 2.415 2.292 1.470 1.643 2.217 1.678 1.680 2.724 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Chilean Exporters Association 
 
Table 6. 
Chile and Argentina: Comparative Analyses of export structure 
 
  Apples (HHI 2011) Table Grapes (HHI 2011) 
  Chile Argentine Chile Argentine 
Region/Country HHI n Norma-lized HHI n 
Norma- 
lized 
HHI n 
Norma- 
lized 
HHI n 
Norma- 
lized 
Average 701 101 0,1717 1651 44 0,262 456 192 0,1483 3305 40 0,4242 
Central region 447 81 0,1053 1728 31 0,2419 293 162 0,0984 3105 39 0,4044 
Mediterranean 470 70 0,102 1019 24 0,1188 444 87 0,1087 1000 15 0,0599 
United Kingdom 1158 43 0,1935 1173 17 0,103 598 91 0,1457 2126 8 0,1099 
Eastern region 1.860 11 0,1328 8.670 2 0,265 1.234 23 0,147 1.749 8 0,0662 
Northern region 1.807 15 0,1709 2.134 13 0,1887 1.511 16 0,1424 7.204 6 0,4458 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the  Customs of Chile and Argentine 
 
